scientific objectivity is driving out any metaphysical inquiry based on a transcendental approach to the activity of ego. [[And on that basis Stevens can propose that the vehicle disclosed by transcendental subjectivity is the force of imagination. Philosophy can define the importance of this faculty by showing how without it there cannot be a decent critique of how science objectifies the subject. It takes art, however, to appreciate the values disclosed by the activities of this transcendental subject.]] Now I had two reasons to persist. That Stevens is engaged in a metaphysical project may not be startling news. That he does so by elaborating and then modifying the relation of a transcendental ego to the Husserlian life-world is considerably more promising as a topic, if only because that makes clear why his poetry has to concentrate on the agency of the self as producing and responding to the world. Stevens simply could not do the work in which he was most interested, and arguably which was most important to his culture, if he could have been satisfied with the motifs contemporary criticism emphasizes-that is with the description of actual phenomena or dialogical inclusion of other voices or attention to social formations and the dispositions of power they establish.
More important, I am convinced that contemporary criticism for the most part fails to appreciate the force or the value of that compulsion to a metaphysical orientation-hence its displacement by the issue of Stevensian politics. Stevens metaphysical talk about the imagination and reality seems old news at best, evasions of the pressure of reality at the worst. But Stevensian metaphysics is not reducible to such themes-especially if read through Husserl who emphasizes how the transcendental ego is deployed and provides a ground for speculating on the role of the affects attributed to the stances such an ego takes. Our efforts to intensify our grasp of Stevensian metaphysics are crucial to keeping vital the force and value of his poems, and by implication of poetry in general. And the better we grasp the force of his ideas as embodied in his poetry, the better we also realize how some aspects of these ideas enter into crisis and require further modification that also extend what we might call their existential bite.
Second, these developing interests in Husserl's text made me think I could make a substantial contribution to the topic of this conference. Not only had I found a European who would be helpful but I also found an issue-the idea of Stevens as engaged in a distinctive metaphysical project--that promises to take on fresh life in relation to this specific context. This vision of Stevens offers a possible polemical stance that might help frame our discussions. For I am somewhat skeptical of the positive form in which our stated topic is presented. Talking about Wallace Stevens in Europe remains on the same logical level as talking about the Americanness of Wallace Stevens. Both formulations risk forcing us into historical anecdote, influence studies, or attention to matters of reception and translation that at best nibble around the edges of Stevens' central concerns. In contrast, the thematics of imagination and reality may be old hat, but they at least orient us toward those central concerns and challenge us to come up with fresh ways of seeing how those concerns shape the force and value of Stevens' poetry.
So I propose for the conference our posing in negative form the issue that I think is paramount for the organizers: what aspects of Stevens are not addressed well if we confine ourselves to Stevens relations to American contexts. Then we try to take up a perspective from which all national perspectives seem somewhat marginal to this poet who emphasized the distinctive "level of truth" at which the poet can be seen to "compose his poems" (CPP 682)? And we can criticize the tendency to bind Stevens to American history and to American philosophy without insisting on corresponding European constraints on his, and our, imaginings. In particular I want to propose Husserlian phenomenology as a more sensitive and less jingoistic framework for talking about Stevens' poetry than any model of pragmatism can provide. For Husserl captures the actual dynamics of how the ego is constructed, so we can talk about the dynamics of poetry rather than simply selected themes. That in turn better positions us to appreciate how the poems might address various cultural crises shared by Americans and Europeans. This is Husserl's most succinct definition of the crisis he saw facing the European sciences:
The genuine spiritual struggles of European humanity as such take the form of struggles between the philosophies, that is, between the skeptical philosophies-or nonphilosophies, which retain the word but not the task-and the actual and still vital philosophies. But the vitality of the latter consists in the fact that they are struggling for their own true and genuine meaning and thus for the meaning of a genuine humanity. To bring latent reason to the understanding of its own possibilities and thus to bring to insight the possibility of metaphysics as a true possibility-this is the only way to put metaphysics or universal philosophy on the strenuous road to realization.
1
Husserl shared the sense, widespread among early twentieth century philosophers, that the successes of science had created a dangerous situation: as scientific procedures increasingly became the only way of securing what can be claimed as objective knowledge, the Cartesian domain of self-reflective consciousness became relegated to mere subjectivity and so divorced from any claim to value or significance for humanity in general. But his specific way of engaging this crisis is distinctive. Where Henri Bergson or William James would give up on metaphysics in favor of a new psychology, Husserl adapts Kant's transcendental perspective-not to secure categorical reason but to provide access to aspects of specific form-giving powers shared by all human beings who can be said to participate in the same "life-world." He does also develop a a new psychology but asks it still to do the work of metaphysical speculation.
Husserl calls this phase of his philosophy "transcendental subjectivism" (CSE 97). Its basic premise is that the science's version of objectivism is "naïve" because it depends on what can be represented by its methods rather than inquiring into how the process of representation is grounded in the life-world of subjects (CSE 96). Philosophy has to discover what our capacity for representation involves so that there can be a shared world: we have to know how we develop orientations that establish a horizon of other people and other attentions as "part" of the framework establishing the object status of phenomena (CSE 108).
2 This requires a transcendental subject because any empirical subject we analyze will be simply a part of the world, not a condition for there to be world in the first place. Objectifying science, on the other hand, treats subject positions as causally determined by perceptions or by interests. Science assumes that the subject is caught up entirely in practical ends. It cannot "bracket" its own habits of seeing and so cannot envision the subject as the source of possibilities for a world. But philosophy can establish such brackets by withholding the assumptions producing the "validities" or general practical expectations given by the practices we trust (CSE 135). For this frees reflection to articulate a "general structure" within experience, "to which everything that exists relatively is bound, although the structure is not itself relative" (CSE 139).
3
Imagine situations where we orient ourselves by feeling or where we construct objects by combining several sensory domains, or enact what Stevens claims for the imagination. Here the subject has to be constructed because it frames objectivity but cannot be made the object of a coherent predicate. This is the subject of the "life-world," a subject requiring a different kind of objectivity from the objectivity of science. The objectivity of the life-world is established by a transcendental judgment about what is involved in "the world's own manner of being" (CSE 123) so that it proves compatible with human existence. Different subjects will realize these powers differently, but the powers themselves will be recognizable across those differences-otherwise we could not have any sense of one world. Yet that sense of one world is fundamental because there is at the basis of our experience a sense that "the world … does not exist as an entity , as an object, but exists with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it" (CSE 143 And so the freed man said.
It was how the sun came shining into his room:
To be without a description of to be, For a moment on rising, at the edge of a bed, to be,
To have the ant of the self changed to an ox
With its organic boomings … It was how he was free. It was how his freedom came.
It was being without description, being an ox.
It was the importance of the trees outdoors.
The freshness of the oak-leaves, not so much That they were oak leaves, as the way they looked.
It was everything being more real, himself
At the center of reality, seeing it.
It was everything bulging and blazing and big in itself,
The blue of the rug, the portrait of Vidal, Qui fait fi des joliesses banales, the chairs. (CPP 187)
Stevens here is a metaphysician fascinated by how the feel for being "without a description of to be" can transform the ant of the self into an ox (while also recognizing the precariousness of this transformation). Such fascination trumps any affiliation with America: the psychological transformations derived from our senses of being are more elemental conditions and much better suited to the ambitions of a philosophical poet than any commitment to nationality (although he also recognized that nationality will out, just as disposition will out . In fact this turn to psychology as a way of returning to metaphysical questions affords affinities not just with the range of European My case for Stevens as metaphysician now ironically forces me to play the pragmatist-what concrete practical differences does it make in our reading of Stevens to stress this metaphysical strain rather than specify various American features of his work?
I suggest two basic differences in our reading, each with several corollaries. The first involves the possibility of fleshing out Stevens's claims about the imagination by emphasizing the dynamic features they produce in his poetry; the second allows us to specify how the poems in the "Rock" render the transcendental ego a more intimate, more self-reflexive, and more supple force than it had been in Stevens' earlier efforts to make poetry engage ontological questions.
10
The parallels between Husserl and Stevens make it clear how Stevens' concept of and feel for the "imagination" require focusing on the psychology of the transcendental ego within the life-world, even at the risk of alienating many poets and critics who prefer the more "meaty" dynamics of social encounter. 11 Here I will assume that the audience is familiar with Stevens's repeated claims about imagination 12 and his consequent need to keep his concept as far as possible from what Lacan called the imaginary (and Simon
Critchley "fancy").Imagination is distinctive in fact precisely because it requires a more concrete, more immediate, and more capacious context for its operations than can be provided by any form of social analysis. Indeed that is why the concept depends on a transcendental ego-not the self who experiences but the self whose affective being must be projected to explain the possibility of the experiences that we "realize." Directly to p.
18] [[Assuming familiarity with Stevens's ideas about imagination allows time to
analyze what a brief poem can do to dramatize the role of the transcendental subject and so "realize" its capacity to "piece the world together, boys, but not with your hands (CPP 177). This is "July Mountain," a title that in itself suggests the instability of substance and the primacy of the "how," since the mountain has only the substance given by its immediate temporal context in the life world:
We live in a constellation
Of patches and pitches, Not in a single world,
In things said well in music,
On the piano and in speech,
As in a page of poetry-
Thinkers without final thoughts
In an always incipient cosmos,
The way, when we climb a mountain,
Vermont throws itself together. (CPP 476)
The sequence followed in this poem is at least as important as what it claims. It begins by asserting the plural and collective subject because that is the perfect corollary of the ontology involved. When the object becomes only impressions, only "a constellation of pitches and patches," it must be the perceiving activity that takes on substance affording the precisions of music or speech. But this condition of self-consciousness brings significant danger. As the poem expands it seems almost to erase the object world because the subject seems so full of its own power. The poem seems to turn into a paean to the powers of imagination possessed by the thinker in this "always incipient cosmos," a phrase whose abstraction indicates how far we have traveled from the particulars of sensation. Then the speaker or the poem seems to hear the increasing emptiness of the rhetoric, so that the conclusion turns instead to refocussing that consciousness on the particular scene.
Ultimately this expansive rhetoric proves a dialectical force reflecting a significant power of the imagination. As consciousness congratulates itself it also prepares a space beyond that way of viewing the world, a space where it can see the satisfactions possible in our own acts of seeing. For it prepares the possibility that the entire landscape can become an active force. It is not just a small scene that "throws itself together" but an entire state (albeit a small one). This concrete awareness may not have an object as grand as the "always incipient cosmos." But it finds something better, something that makes us self-reflexively aware of what can reward the effort to climb a mountain in order to attune ourselves to what unfolds. It turns out that our activity in positioning ourselves makes it feasible to see the object as itself active, as throwing itself together without compromising its facticity. And, by another delicious stroke of irony, Stevens plays on the fact the subject of this last verb, the state of Vermont, is as transcendental as the subject doing the perceiving. "Vermont" in fact has no existence that can be perceived; it is like the university rather than the buildings that make up the university. 13 Its boundaries can be mapped, but there is no corresponding substance except in the imagination. Yet the imagination responds to its affective reality as the continuation of the substance of the scene. Just imaginative care for sequence reveals how much the transcendental is at stake in the simplest perceptions.
Obviously there is much more to be said about the imagination, especially about It is not an image. It is a feeling.
There is no image of the hero.
There is a feeling as definition.
How could there be an image, an outline, A design, a marble soiled by pigeons?
The hero is a feeling, a man seen
As if the eye was an emotion,
As if in seeing we saw our feeling The drama here is all in how we are led through different stages of thinking. Initially we are presented with sharp contrasts. After the feeling is separated from the image, a second contrast seems also to place on the feeling the burden of reconstituting those images once able to sustain the idea of heroism. Then the contrast makes the notion of image seem so remote that it must be entertained as a negative hypothetical. Perhaps the more abstract the reflection needed to maintain the idea of image, the more concrete the alternative becomes. So the poem considers itself freed to turn directly to the most proprioceptive of feelings. These feelings attach to the hero by virtue of their being engaged in the self's processes of thinking. Both the content and the form of the "as if"
constructions require first seeing our seeing as itself a charged activity, then recognizing that we can work through to significant second-order feelings by refusing to let sight be consumed by its objects. Second-order feelings place the object within the frame afforded by the subject.
With feeling so abstracted, and thereby made so concretely a part of the activity of seeing, the poet can propose a clear alternative to allegory, yet maintain the discursive distance and substantial generality sought by the allegorical impulse. Where allegory is necessary to give significance to objects of sight, the concluding lines here can locate the and "human" by locating them in the quickenings that they elicit. It is these quickenings that give us the richest possible modes of identification as individuals and as social beings whose conative intensities prove here entirely shareable. And it is these quickenings that make sense of Stevens's interest in the idea of the exponent, the discursive work that also functions as a means of raising material to more intense powers.
]]
The Rock manages to intensify this sense of human powers while making two major adjustments in how Stevens stages the transcendental ego and corresponding roles for the imagination. Traditionally any sign of will proves embarrassing to the work of meditation, just as a personal preface is an embarrassment to a work of philosophy. That fear of exposing neediness is a large reason why before The Rock Stevens had cultivated an imposing distance enabling the poems to turn playfully on themselves and, more important, to keep subjectivity at a transcendental distance that could hope to establish the possibility of world-constitution rather than struggle to impose particular interests.
The Rock, in contrast, tries to replace that distance with a sense of intimacy between writer and the consciousness displayed in the poem. A highly condensed play of perspectives replaces the sense that a single project keeps control of the details within the now it is extended from the faculty by which we engage the world to the faculty by which we take our stand on why that engagement might matter.
A quick example will help, then I want to elaborate these differences by contrasting my view to Simon Critchley's interpretation of Stevens's project in his late poems. This is "An Old Man Asleep," the first poem in The Rock:
The two worlds are asleep, are sleeping now.
A dumb sense possesses them in a kind of solemnity.
The self and the earth-your thoughts, your feelings, Your beliefs and disbeliefs, your whole peculiar plot;
The redness of your reddish chestnut trees,
The river motion, the drowsy motion of the river R. give the sleeping person a psychology, albeit a psychology so elemental that it can be adapted to the very bare facts of the situation. That is why the poem moves from "asleep" to "are sleeping"; why the sleeping is attributed to an elemental relation between self and earth; and why there is such smooth transition between that general condition and the terms of direct address, "your thoughts, your feelings, … ." It is as if the poem found a level of being where the condition of address and the condition of description were almost identical. But to realize this identity we need to open ourselves to a different order of being that the practical one to which we are accustomed. We have to produce an imagined world in which we can honor "your peculiar plot" while recognizing that this plot consists largely of simply sleeping. But it is his sleeping, as all of the markers of address in the poem insist. All these general terms do not preclude address but solicit it, as if agency could be fully recognized and invoked by accepting the minimal yet completely expansive shift that occurs when something compels us to move from description to address.
This movement seems to me to constitute a double affirmation-of the power that the individual still has to take responsibility for his meanings, and of the sleeping itself as an acceptance of continuity with the rest of being-without complaint and without regret.
The ease with which the poem combines levels of being has to be attributed to the person sleeping, if only because that ease is so connected to a repetitiousness that itself becomes an affective feature of the old man's world. But even in this repetition there is evidence of the peculiar plot. How otherwise can we explain the resonance of "drowsy" in this poem? The addition of "drowsy" to the repetition of "river motion" provides a little climax in relation to the poem's use of address, because even when the self is reduced almost to the object it can elicit something excessive and at least somewhat distinctive.
Here I have to admit that the distinction is mostly on the level of sound, since "drowsy" Critchley's basic argument about these late poems is bold and sharp. The Rock is driven by two basic correlated desires. Stevens wants to show one can give up a sense that the ego matters while retaining the assertive powers of poetry: "the moment of the ego's assertion, in swelling up to fill a universe without god, is also the point at which it shrinks to insignificance" (87). (No more oxes out of ants.) And given this diminishing of the ego, the status of the object in lyric poetry has to change. Reading Stevens's "cure of the ground" as "the desire to be cured of the desire for poetry" (83), Critchley argues that in a new realism "poetry can be brought closer to the plain sense of things, to things in the remoteness from us and our intentions" (84). The total grandeur of a total edifice,
Chosen by an inquisitor of structures For himself. He stops upon this threshold,
As if the design of all his words takes form
And frame from thinking and is realized.
Will is how thinking and realizing become one, raising the world to theater while simultaneously reducing the world to transparency. Therefore it is not a major exaggeration to suggest that Stevens's entire career might be summarized as the exploration of the founding difference between "real" and "realized. It is difficult even to choose the adjective For this blank cold, this sadness without cause.
The great structure has become a minor house
No turban walks across the lessened floors.
The greenhouse never so badly needed paint.
The chimney is fifty years old and slants to one side.
A fantastic effort has failed, a repetition
In a repetitiousness of men and flies.
Yet the absence of imagination had
Itself to be imagined. The great pond,
The plain sense of it, without reflections, leaves, Mud, water like dirty glass, expressing silence
Of a sort, silence of a rat come out to see,
The great pond and its waste of lilies, all this
Had to be imagined as an inevitable knowledge,
Required, as a necessity requires. (CPP 428)
The best way to see what is distinctive in this poem is to contrast it with "The Snow
Man." That poem had two basic commitments, starkly realized. One was to define as cleanly as possible a world reduced to what demands "a mind of winter." The other was to make manifest the continuing presence of some kind of synthetic force that in fact could serve as the minding of that winter because it has the power to contain the entire scene in an elaborate single sentence. "The Plain Sense of Things" offers neither that concentrated reduction of the scene nor that particular model of compositional power.
Instead the pacing is much slower, the language no longer driven by a single syntactic structure. Why? What about the absence of imagination can Stevens render in this mode that he could not in the earlier poem?
Both poems treat the "inert savoir" as if it were a response to world in which it is impossible for adjectives to enhance being: being seems deprived of any qualities that relieve its absolute thereness. "The Plain Sense of Things" also has to contend with a sense of history ("a fantastic effort has failed") that prevents it from realizing the kind of present tense established by "The Snow Man" single synthetic sentence. So in the later poem the mind keeps on doing the work of comparison, unwilling or unable to give up on the possibility of still being able to choose adjectives even if they have to take negative form. For even when the adjectives fail, the mind seems capable of varying the modes by which it views this bleakness. At this negative center, even the silence turns out to elicit analogies.
None of these analogies has transformative power. Yet the entire series makes the absence of imagination less a fact to be registered than a transcendental condition to be inhabited by observing what it elicits. After choice is mentioned, the poem turns swiftly to the transformation of a "great structure" into a "minor house," a measuring of loss that soon generates a strange form of negation: "no turban walks across the lessened floors."
Then there is a second comparison based on physical observation, and finally a bleak generalization about failure that in its turn generates further analogies. It seems that the imagination must describe the negative as well as the positive, so that the sense of absence of imagination becomes the imagination's feel for its present situation.
Negatives populate scenes so that we can feel a non-presence within them. Then with the abstract statement that "the absence of imagination had/ Itself to be imagined," the mind tries to articulate its own heightened response to what turn out to be its own figures.
By the time the poem utters this abstract generalization it is putting into the mode of necessity what it had already discovered on the order of simple description. It is entering the domain where will is called upon to engage what is described. Not surprisingly, this generalization makes a major change in the poem. The discursive mode has to handle a shift from describing a situation to describing a mental state while maintaining the same distance and flatness it had directed toward the scene. Stevens's response to that challenge is magnificent. He turns to "the great pond, the plain sense of it," even though no pond has been mentioned. Consequently the pond hovers between one imagined as actual and one that exists primarily as part of a metaphor for how the absence of imagination can be imagined. Projected description and self-referential metaphoric reach become strangely identical.
This identity is celebrated in the great figure of the "rat come out to see." Again the rat could be part of the imagined scene. But it also could be the mind's figure for its own pushing itself on the scene so as to find ways to figure the absence of imagination.
The rat parallels the mind's uncomfortable but somehow fated presence as witness to this desolation, and as one more feature of the desolation that has to be imagined. Now, though, "imagination" is no longer an abstract term. It becomes just what can encompass an identification with how this rat emerges in this situation.
Appreciating the rat requires recognizing why any analogue with a human observer would limit the poem. Confronted with this scene, the most the mind can do is compose an emblem for its own estrangement in a bizarrely intimate way. By having a figure of consciousness that is also a figure of non-identity with the self the poem can encompass the scope of the poverty it confronts. Yet for this knowledge to take hold the poem also has to go beyond the figure of the rat to a more capacious mode of agency.
That figure binds the mind to pure contingency: the poem gives no reason why the rat emerges, nor does it explain why the figure seems so apt for the situation. Nonetheless the bond to that contingency seems not contingent at all: all this had to be imagined. As the mind seems forced to confront absolute contingency, it reaches also for a corresponding accommodation to necessity.
The daunting nature of that task becomes the poem's richest evidence for why it has to call upon imagination. Only imagination can establish the theatrical terms by which there can be figures for the viewing of this poverty. And only imagination can bring to bear a sense of this poverty as inseparable from our destiny as human beings. Needing to pursue a plain sense of things in this most unplain way is the price we pay for having the investments we do in recognizing and appreciating our situations. But this price seems worth paying, so long as we can imagine imagining a quasi-identification with this rat as a basic aspect of that poverty. Such imagining provides an instrument for coming to terms with a fatality too comprehensive and abstract to be engaged by discursive had to be imagined in the mode that necessity requires. All this has to be attuned to the contingent emergence of the rat as the locus for realizing a bleakness that itself may be elemental rather than contingent. But this sense of necessity cannot be encompassed by description. We have to reflect on what is afforded by the series of "as" expressions as they connect the contingent and the necessary. Our thinking and our figuring all become aspects of our recognizing that we are not so much describing the absence of imagination as ritually manifesting where we are positioned when we make that attempt. We have to align entirely with necessity, but at a distance, in another tree, provided by everything that our ability to use "as" makes visible.
Such use proves most important for its giving sharp content to the "we" that begins as only a hopeful assertion in the poem's first stanza. This "we" evokes a transcendental 2 "We are objects among objects … as being here and there, in the plain certainty of experience, before anything that is established scientifically. On the other hand, we are subjects for the world, namely, as the ego-subjects experiencing it, contemplating it, valuing it, related to it purposefully …" (CSE 105). 3 For this claim in opposition to science consider CSE 99: "It is a philosophy which, in opposition to prescientific and scientific objectivism goes back to knowing subjectivity as the primal locus of all objective formations of sense and ontic validity, and in this way seeks to set in motion an essentially new type of scientific attitude and a new type of philosophy." Even Kant and his heirs do not produce valid science because they do not establish "cognitions ultimately grounded, i.e. not ultimately, theoretically responsible for themselves." 4 "Whatever exists, whether it has a concrete or abstract, real or ideal, meaning, has its manners of self-givenness and, on the side of the ego, its manners of intention in modes of validity; to this belong the manners of the subjective variation of these modes in syntheses of individual-subjective and intersubjective harmony and discrepancy. … For each subject this intention is the cogito; the manners of givenness (understood in the widest sense) make up its cogitatum according to the "what" and the "how," and the manners of givenness in turn bring to exhibition the one and the same entity which is their unity" (CSE 166-67). 5 CPP 679. The passage goes on to sound very metaphysical, with emphasis on how "the imagination never brings anything into the world but that, on the contrary, like the personality of the poet in the act of creating, it is no more than a process, and desiring with all the power of our desire not to write falsely, do we not begin to think of the possibility that poetry is only reality after all, and that poetic truth is factual truth …" (CPP 680). 6 Pragmatist philosophers tend either to continue the project of scientific objectification, putting a human face on it by aligning with scientific practicality rather than empiricist ontology (like Dewey) or by collapsing metaphysics into psychology. Even when James turns to matters of religious belief, he is satisfied to cast the issue in psychological contexts that take him as far as possible from addressing the metaphysics of the relevant claims. For my sense of the limits of pragmatism, see my "Practical Sense--Impractical Objects: Why Neo-Pragmatism Cannot Sustain an Aesthetics." REAL: Yearbook of "bring about fluctuations in reality in words free from mysticism" remaining independent of one's desires to elevate or idealize it (CPP 639-640), and to destroy the false version of itself as ""some incalculable vates within us" while functioning like light to add "nothing except itself" and yet utterly transform our sense of the value of what we encounter (681).
13 I borrow this reference to the university from Gilbert Ryle, The concept of Mind. The major abstraction is the idea of man And major man is its exponent, abler In the abstract than in his singular. (CP 388) Major man is our fiction of our own fullest self-satisfactions. And because those satisfactions must include an idea of themselves, major man is abler in the abstract than in his singular. The good news is that for major man that abstract is also inseparable from singularity, most pronouncedly as the vehicle for identifications that do not require reaching beyond our thinking processes to shadowy images of selves we think we are or want to become. Poetry need not build up idealizing notions of its subject matter because it can put all its energies into how this individual expounding takes place. Rather than build make-believe worlds, poets need be concerned only with the making of a "vivid transparence" (CP 380) that quickens our appreciation of what our relations to the world make possible. The abstraction necessary for a philosophical poetry exists not in the ideas but in the scope of the direct thinking by which the exponential stance engages its subject. And because the magnification of intensities depends on simple expoundings, our senses of empowerment come with an inescapable social horizon. We are bound to each other through the qualities of expounding that our language can produce. I describe this state at some length in my 16 A longer statement of Critchley's is worth quoting: "We see things in their mereness, in their plainness and remoteness from us, and we accept it calmly, without the frustrated assertions and juvenile overreachings of the will. Such calm is not thoughtlessness, but rather thoughtful, insight that comes from having things in sight. At its best poetry offers an experience of the world as meditation, the mind slowing in front of things, the mind pushing back against the pressure of reality through the minimal transfigurations of the imagination" (88). Put crudely, I am suspicious of this account because it does not correlate either with the paucity of things in late Stevens or the marvelous outflow of lyrics (which is hard to explain as all motivated by emerging disbelief in the lyric). 17 These poems are much less about things than about people accommodating themselves to things, as in Lebensweishheitspielerei:
Each person completely touches us With what he is and as he is, In the stale grandeur of annihilation. (CPP 430) 
